Shane Buczek v. Charles Maiorana by unknown
2013 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-15-2013 
Shane Buczek v. Charles Maiorana 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013 
Recommended Citation 
"Shane Buczek v. Charles Maiorana" (2013). 2013 Decisions. 836. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013/836 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2013 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
AMENDED GLD-112      NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-1050 
___________ 
 
SHANE CHRISTOPHER BUCZEK, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
CHARLES MAIORANA; PAMELA BUTLER, CCM, Pittsburgh; 
CRAIG SWINEFORD, Caseworker 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 3:12-cv-00191) 
District Judge:  Honorable Kim R. Gibson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
January 31, 2013 
 
Before: FUENTES, FISHER and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: May 15, 2013) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Shane Christopher Buczek, proceeding pro se, appeals from an order of the United 
States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania dismissing as moot his 
habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  There being no substantial question 
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presented on appeal, we will grant the Government‟s motion for summary action and 
affirm the decision of the District Court.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
 Because we write primarily for the parties, we need only recite the facts necessary 
for our discussion.  In September 2012, while incarcerated at FCI Loretto in Loretto, 
Pennsylvania, Buczek filed a § 2241 petition alleging that the date of his placement at a 
residential re-entry center (“RRC”) was inconsistent with the Second Chance Act of 
2007.  In November 2012, Appellees suggested that Buczek‟s petition was moot because 
he had been placed in an RRC in Buffalo, New York on November 6, 2012.  A 
Magistrate Judge recommended that Buczek‟s § 2241 petition be dismissed as moot, and 
on December 12, 2012, the District Court adopted the recommendation and dismissed 
Buczek‟s petition as moot.  Buczek then timely filed this appeal.1 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a).
2
   “The standard 
of review over the District Court‟s mootness determination is plenary.”  Burkey v. 
Marberry, 556 F.3d 142, 146 (3d Cir. 2009).  We may summarily affirm on any basis 
supported by the record.  Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per 
curiam). 
Article III of the Constitution provides that federal courts may only adjudicate 
“actual, ongoing cases or controversies.”  Lewis v. Cont‟l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 
(1990).  This requirement continues throughout all states of federal judicial proceedings.  
                                              
1
 Buczek was released from the custody of the Bureau of Prisons shortly before filing his 
notice of appeal. 
2
 A certificate of appealability is not required to appeal the denial of a § 2241 petition.  
Burkey v. Marberry, 556 F.3d 142, 146 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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See Burkey v. Marberry, 556 F.3d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 2009).  “This means that, throughout 
the litigation, the plaintiff „must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury 
traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.‟”  
Spencer v. Kemma, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998) (quoting Lewis, 494 U.S. at 477). 
We agree with the District Court that Buczek‟s transfer to an RRC rendered his 
habeas petition moot.  See Demis v. Sniezek, 558 F.3d 508, 513 (6th Cir. 2009).  Even if 
the District Court were to render a decision in Buczek‟s favor regarding RRC placement, 
it could provide no redress for any injury that Buczek may have suffered from the Bureau 
of Prisons‟ action.  Furthermore, the District Court correctly noted that Buczek has not 
asserted any “collateral consequences” to overcome the finding of mootness.  See id. at 
516 (“Because [petitioner] can point to no „collateral consequences‟ that are the result of 
his delayed placement in [an RRC], and certainly none that persist after the expiration of 
his sentence or which this Court to remedy in the habeas context, [petitioner‟s] reliance 
on the „collateral consequences‟ exception to mootness is unavailing.”).  Notably, Buczek 
has not claimed any collateral consequences based on delayed commencement of any 
term of supervised release that he may be serving, and such a claim would be insufficient 
in light of his recent release from custody.  See Burkey, 556 F.3d at 148. 
For the foregoing reasons, we grant the Government‟s motion for summary action 
and will summarily affirm the District Court‟s order.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 
10.6.  We deny as moot the Government‟s motion to stay the briefing schedule and deny 
Buczek‟s motion to take mandatory judicial notice. 
